Re Moore and Texaco Canada Ltd., [1965] 2 O.R. 253, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 300 by Przybylski, Z.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 4, Number 1 (April 1966) Article 10
Re Moore and Texaco Canada Ltd., [1965] 2 O.R.
253, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 300
Z. Przybylski
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Commentary
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information




be expeditious and grant the deserted wife compassion. But fortu-
nately, this interest will not conflict with the real need to keep real
property transactions in a simple straight forward form.45
PAUL D. TEMELINI:
RE MOORE AND TEXAcO CANADA LTD., [1965] 2 O.R. 253, 50 D.L.R.
(2d) 300 (Ont. C.A.)-MORTGAGE-OPTION TO PURCHASE TO MORT-
GAGEE-WHETHER INCONSISTENT WITH THE RIGHT TO REDEEM-
WHETHER COLLATERAL TERMS OPPRESSIVE-MORTGAGE IRREDEEMABLE
FOR 25 YEARS-STATUTORY RIGHT TO REDEEM.-In the recent case of
Re Moore and Texaco Canada Ltd.,' the High Court of Ontario was
confronted with a mortgage transaction involving terms and condi-
tions which the courts have customarily viewed with suspicion when
found in a mortgage document. Charles Moore agreed to purchase
from Texaco Canada Limited a service station in the City of Ottawa
and to perfect the transaction five documents were signed by him.
First, he signed an offer to purchase the service station and by the
terms of the offer he agreed to sell only Texaco products at the
service station for 25 years.2 Second, he completed an application
to Texaco for a mortgage loan wherein he agreed to a tie-in pro-
vision for a term of 25 years and also agreed to grant Texaco an
option to repurchase the service station for $29,200, and to grant
Texaco a right of first refusal on any offer tendered to Moore. Third,
Texaco granted the property to Moore in a deed made in pursuance
of The Short Forms of Conveyances Act,3 which contained no reser-
vations or conditions. Fourth, by a mortgage granted by Moore to
Texaco for the unpaid purchase price the mortgagor waived the pro-
vision of the Interest Act,4 s. 10, and The Mortgages Act,5 s. 16,
and an agreement of even date was declared to be incorporated into
the mortgage. On a page added to the back of the mortgage, Moore
granted Texaco an option to purchase the property for $29,200. Fifth,
by an agreement of even date with the mortgage Moore again agreed
to a tie-in provision for twenty-five years, agreed that the mortgage
was to be irredeemable for 25 years, that the property was to be used
primarily as a service station and granted the company the right to
45 Since the case, the English High Court has decided Holden v. Holden(1965), 109 Sol. Journal 1028, (1965) 12 Current Law, No. 336a. A wife suc-
cessfully obtained an interlocutory injunction prohibiting her husband from
selling the matrimonial home after deserting her. The husband owned the
land subject to a mortgage to a bank. N.P.B. v. Ainsworth did not deny the
wife's personal right to stay in the home, and in the absence of any evidence
that the bank might exercise its rights upon default of mortgage payments,
the wife was entitled to the injunction while her application under the
Married Woman's Property Act came on for hearing.
Mr. Temelini is a second year student at the Osgoode Hall Law School.
[ 1965] 2 O.R. 253, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 300 (Ont. H.C.).2 Hereinafter referred to as a "tie-in provision".
3 R.S.O. 1950, c. 360.
4 R.S.C. 1952, c. 156.
5 R.S.O. 1960, c. 245.
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terminate the agreement at the end of every fifth year and the right
to repurchase the property.
The mortgage provided for monthly payments over ten years
and a final payment at the end of the twenty-fifth year which could
not be paid before that time. Moore, however, paid the mortgage off
in nine years, except for the last payment which Texaco would not
accept until the twenty-fifth year. He applied to the court for:
(a) an order declaring the option in favour of Texaco to be
null and void, and
(b) an order declaring that the provisions making the mortgage
irredeemable for 25 years and the tie-in provision, were
null and void.
Determination of the Validity of the Option
The applicant asked for an order declaring the option void on
the ground of the equitable maxium "Once a mortgage, always a
mortgage",6 and that consequently any stipulation restricting the
equity of redemption is void as repugnant to the right of the mort-
gagor to redeem.7 At equity, the right to redeem exists because it is
of the essence of a mortgage transaction that the property is given
as security for a loan only.8 Grant J. in the present case restates the
principle in the following words:
An option given as a condition to the granting of a loan constitutes a
clog on the equity of redemption and is repugnant to the right of the
mortgagor to redeem if the transaction is one of loan only. The right
to redeem and obtain a reconveyance of the property given as security
exists because to hold otherwise would be repugnant to the principle of
a loan and the true intentions of the parties.9
It was the intention of the parties which Grant J. seized upon
to distinguish the present case from those decisions which had held
that an option to purchase in a mortgage is void.10 It was his opinion
that the intention of the parties was to enter into a purchase and
sale transaction, not a mortgage transaction." There being no pro-
hibition against a purchaser granting a vendor an option to repur-
chase, the present option was valid. He said:
All the circumstances of the case indicate that the mortgage transaction
as well as the option to purchase are parts of a vender and purchaser
agreement and that therefore the equitable principle above referred to
has no application and the option attached to such mortgage cannot on
that ground be set aside or declared to be null and void.12
The decision of the learned judge was based on the judgment
of Pickup C.J.O. in Ottawa Construction Ltd. v. Barnhart-Cochrane
6 Seton v. glade (1802), 7 Ves. 265, at p. 273.
7 Newcomb v. Bonham (1681), 1 Vern. 7.
8 E. H. Scammeel, Once a Mortgage, always a Mortgage (1961), 24 Mod.
Law Rev. 385.
9 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 258.
10 The leading case is Samuel v. Jarrah Timber and Wood Pairing Com.
Iany Ltd., [1904) A.C. 323.
11 Grant J. applied the analysis of intention in Wilson v. Ward, [1930J
S.C.R. 212, (1930) 2 D.L.R. 433.
12 Supra, footnote 1, D.L.R. at p. 307.
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Ltd. et al.13 wherein it was held that the intention of the parties
must be looked at and given effect to, even if as part of the trans-
action the vendor takes back a mortgage to secure the unpaid portion
of the purchase price and an option to repurchase. However, the
Ottawa Construction case was a very different case from the present.
There the lands were to all intents and purposes always under the
control of the vendor who was given, not only a right to repurchase
two thirds of the property conveyed to the purchaser, but a right to
do so at the nominal consideration of one dollar within fourteen
months of the conveyance, or as soon as the purchaser secured a
building permit, whichever was sooner. In the words of Pickup C.J.O.:
It was never the intention of the parties that the lands which, under the
agreement for sale might revert to the appellant for a nominal con-
sideration were to be vested in the appellant by way of security only.14
The sale in the present case was not such a transparent or arti-
ficial transaction as was the one in the Ottawa Construction case.
The purchaser was clearly intended to get full and effective posses-
sion and ownership of the lands for a considerable period. Further-
more, the mortgage was clearly for security purposes and on the
authorities "a mortgage can never provide at the time of making
for any event or condition on which the equity of redemption shall
be discharged and the conveyance made absolute."1 5 It should there-
fore be immaterial that the mortgage is part of a larger transaction
if, as in Re Moore and Texaco, the intention of the parties was to
secure money by way of a purchase money mortgage.
Granting that the doctrine nullifying an option given to a mort-
gagee in a mortgage transaction is a technical one, nevertheless it
would be more technical and confusing for the courts to develop
over-subtle exceptions to the rule. An English court has recently
refused to make such an exception in the case of an option granted
by the mortgagor to a person willing to take a transfer of a mort-
gage and pay off the original mortgage. 6 Now that Grant J. has
seen fit to make an exception to the general rule in the present case,
we are left uncertain whether the exception applies in the case of
all purchase money mortgages, or just in commercial transactions.
The learned judge is at pains to point out that the granting of an
option on the sale of a service station by a petroleum company is
a necessary condition of the transaction to ensure that the station
does not become the property of a competitor company and to enable
the company to repurchase the property if the purchaser is, as
13 [1953] 4 D.L.R. 571 (Ont. C.A.). The Ontario Court of Appeal applied
the short judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Daires v. Chamberlain(1909), 26 T.L.R. 138.
14 [1953] 4 D.L.R. 571, at p. 575.
15 Samuel v. Jarrah, sulpra, footnote 10, at p. 327 per Lord MacNaghten.
As the quotation indicates, an option to purchase granted when the mort-
gagee is already on foot and by a separate and distinct transaction entered
into after the creation of the Mortgage is perfectly valid although granted
to the mortgagee: Jesle v. Reeve, [1902] 1 Ch. 53 (H.C.).16 Lewis v. Frank Love Ltd., [1961] 1 W.L.R. 261, [1961] 1 All E.R. 446
(H.C.).
1966]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
events turn out, an unsuccessful service station operator.17 While
it may well be argued that such an option is a necessary condition
in certain commercial contracts of the present day, 18 one cannot help
but have reservations, on two accounts, with the manner in which
this new departure is advanced in the present case. First, is it
possible to make the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial transactions in the case of purchase-money mortgage and
yet not apply the same distinction to other sorts of mortgages? There
is no suggestion in the case that the result would have been the same
in a non-purchase money mortgage situation; indeed, the distinction
between purchase and non-purchase money mortgages is the explicit,
if not the implicit, reason for the decision. Second, is not the pur-
chaser of a service station the proverbial "little guy" who requires
the protection of the court of equity when dealing with a corporation
the size of Texaco? Commercial transactions involving two commer-
cial entities may deserve a more restrained supervision by the courts
than commercial transactions between corporate giant and an in-
dividual embarking on his first business venture. When dealing with
options given in these latter transactions, it is suggested that the
court should look to the relative bargaining strength of the parties
and the terms upon which the option has been extracted 19 before
declaring a hands-off policy.
Whether collateral terms are oppressive and unconscionable
The terms which the applicant alleged to be unconscionable and
oppressive were: (i) the term making the mortgage irredeemable for
25 years; (ii) the tie-in provision; (iii) the right of first refusal in
case of a sale by the mortgagee; (iv) the mortgagee's sole right to
cancel the agreement; and (v) the mortgagee's right to repurchase
the property.
Originally any collateral terms were held void20 under the usury
laws as they were considered an evasion of the law limiting the rate
of interest. Since the repeal of the usury laws21 collateral advantages
will only be struck down if they are unconscionable or clog the
equity of redemption.22 In his judgment, Grant J. refers to Kreglinger
v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.,2 3 the leading case
establishing that if it is the intention of the parties to enter into a
contemporaneous but collateral contract contained in the same docu-
ment as the mortgage, that contract will not be struck down unless
17 (1965] 2 O.R. 253, at pp. 260, 261.
18 P. V. Baker, Options as clogs on the equity of redemption (1963), 77
L.Q.R. 163. G. L. Williams, The Doctrine of Repugnancy-III: "Clogging the
Equity" and Miscellaneous Applications (1944), 60 L.Q.R. 190.19 In the present case, the option was granted to the mortgagee-vendor
to repurchase the station at the same price at which the purchaser was
buying the station.
20 Jennings v. Ward (1705), 2 Vern. 520.
21 In 1854.
22 Biggs v. Hoddinott, [1898] 2 Ch. 307 (C.A.); Kreglinger V. New Pala-
gonia Meat and Cold Storage Co. Ltd., [1914] A.C. 25 (H.L.); Barrett 'v.
Hartley (1866), L.R. 2 Eq. 789.23 Supra, footnote 22.
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it is oppressive and unconscionable, or unless the right to redeem is
abrogated. This doctrine was applied in Knightsbridge Estates Trust
v. Byrne24 to find a term of forty years not oppressive, and in Clark v.
Supertest Petroleum Company,25 a case with substantially the same
setting as the present, Jarvis J. held that a term of 25 years was
not oppressive. He states that:
If the mortgagee showed that the petroleum company charged him for
its products a price that was considerably higher than the price charged
by other petroleum companies, I think possibly he would be in a position
to show that a term of 20 years was unconscionable and oppressive.26
In view of this case, Grant J. had no trouble in holding that a
term of 25 years was not unfair, particularly in view of the pur-
chaser's full awareness of all the terms and the commercial circum-
stances of the transaction.
The learned judge held that no rule of equity prohibited the
granting to Texaco of the right of first refusal because "it does not
prevent the mortgagor from selling but only obligates him to give
the respondent the first opportunity of purchasing at a price suitable
to the mortgagor".27 As far as the other terms in the transaction,
Grant J. holds that:
The terms of the agreement are somewhat more restrictive as to the
use of the premises and more onerous as to the obligation of the mort-
gagor than those that have existed in prior reported cases but in view
of the practices that now exist in the production and marketing of such
products I am not prepared to find the said terms either unconscionable
or unreasonable and the applicant is therefore not entitled to succeed
on this basis.28
No assessment of the vulnerability of the purchaser or the
strength of the vendor is made by Grant J. No real attempt is made
to determine whether the terms on which these conditions were
extracted were fair. The commercial necessities of one party to the
contract become the sole test of the validity of the conditions.
The Statutory Right to Redeem
S. 16 of The Mortgages Act29 gives a mortgagor the right to
tender to the mortgagee the principal and interest due on the mort-
gage, with three months further interest in lieu of notice, at any
time after the fifth year of the mortgage, and if he does so, "no
further interest is chargeable, payable or recoverable at any time
thereafter on the principal money or interest due under the mort-
gage". 30 The applicant sought to combine s. 16 of The Mortgages
24 [1939] Ch. 441 (C.A.).
25 [1958] O.R. 474, 14 D.L.R. (2d) 454 (Ont. H.C.).
26 Ibid., O.R. at p. 483.
27 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 260.
28 Ibid., at pp. 265, 266.
29 Supra, footnote 5. The Interest Act, s. 10, supra, footnote 3, is in sub-
stantially the same wording as s. 16 of The Mortgages Act.30 There is no mention in s. 16 of a right to redeem except for the
marginal note which states, "Right to redeem after 5 years". The Interpreta-
tion Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 191, s. 9 states that a marginal note is not part of
the Act and is only inserted for convenience.
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Act with s. 68(7) of The Registry Act31 which provides that a
person entitled to redeem a mortgage may apply to a Judge for an
order directing a person who has a duty to register a discharge to
so register it, in order to create a statutory right to redeem. Unfortu-
nately, as Grant J. points out, nothing in s. 16 of The Mortgages Act
entitles the mortgagor to redeem as of right and so no statutory
right could be relied upon by the present applicant. In the usual case,
if money is tendered by the mortgagor to a mortgagee, it will be
accepted by the mortgagee as it would be futile for him to have his
money tied up in a mortgage that is not earning interest. If the
mortgagee accepts the full amount due under the mortgage, he is
obliged to discharge the mortgage and can be forced to do so by the
mortgagor under s. 68(7) of The Registry Act32 and s. 10(8) of The
Mortgages Act.33 Where, however, the mortgagee is a merchandising
company and derives from the mortgage collateral advantages far
outweighing the value of interest charges on the mortgage, he will
not accept tender and, although the mortgage will not thereafter
bear interest, the mortgagor is not entitled to redeem until the
mortgage term expires.
No one can doubt that there is great value to be attached to
freedom of contract in commercial transaction. Nevertheless, the
implications of Re Moore and Texaco ought to be made clear:
(1) a merchandising company desiring to effect the result arrived
at by Texaco, has a full set of precedents at his disposal in the present
case,
(2) a merchandising company may validly attach to a purchase-
money mortgage transaction conditions as to use of products and
premises for indeterminate periods of time, but for at least twenty-
five years,
(3) a merchandising company may validly attach an option to
repurchase to a purchase-money mortgage with the result that before
the mortgage term expires the company may repurchase the property.
The advantages to the company of this method of dealing with service
stations over the leasing method is obvious. The company can ensure
that it retains control over profitable service stations which have
increased in value by exercising its option to repurchase before the
mortgage term expires. It need not repurchase the property if the
station is unprofitable or decreasing in value. The company stands to
gain everything and lose nothing.
Z. PRZYBYLSKI"
31 R.S.O. 1960, c. 348.
32 Ibid.
33 Supra, footnote 5.
* Mr. Przybylski is a second year student at the Osgoode Hall Law School.
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